Scientific method. The fundamental concepts

January 9, 2026, 4:00–6:00 p.m. CET

Lecture title: Science

Abstract:
The concept of “science” is the most fundamental concept in science itself. However, defining what science is and what distinguishes it from other forms of knowledge acquisition is an extremely challenging task. In this lecture, two famous but ultimately unsuccessful attempts to solve this problem—so-called verificationism and Popper’s falsificationism—will be critically analyzed and discussed in search of more promising solutions. The distinction between “hard” and “soft” sciences will also be questioned.

January 16, 2026, 4:00–6:00 p.m. CET

Lecture title: Theory and Observation

Abstract:
What is a theory, and what do we mean by observation in science? It is often assumed that theories are logically and conceptually distinct from observations, and in particular, that observation precedes theory formation (both logically and temporally). However, the relationship between the two is more complex, and it could even be argued that observations depend, to some extent, on pre-existing theories. The so-called theory-ladenness of scientific observation (the idea that observations are theory-laden) will be critically discussed with the help of examples from scientific literature.

January 23, 2026, 4:00–6:00 p.m. CET

Lecture title: Scientific Explanation and Understanding

Abstract:
Scientific research seeks to explain and understand natural phenomena. But what exactly constitutes a “good” explanation of a phenomenon? What objective and subjective factors determine our understanding of it?
Philosophers of science have developed several models of scientific explanation that define the relationship between the phenomenon to be explained and the information provided to explain it. Among these are the nomological-deductive, teleological, functional, mechanistic, and narrative models. These models will be outlined and discussed with reference to the various areas of scientific research represented among the participants.

January 30, 2026, 4:00–6:00 p.m. CET

Lecture title: Reduction and Scientific Revolutions

Abstract:
How do scientific theories change, what kinds of transformations can they undergo, and what happens when a theory loses credibility in favor of another? Are the concepts of scientific revolution, paradigm, and research program truly useful to describe scientific change? How can different theories be related to one another?
These major questions would each deserve a full course, but they will be briefly introduced in this final lecture, drawing on the classic works of Kuhn, Lakatos, and Feyerabend, with an eye toward the contemporary debate on the sociology of science.

The general objective of the course is to raise awareness of important philosophical questions that emerge in scientific research. Students will be asked to write a short, self-reflective paper of around 2,000 characters, summarising what they have learned on the course from a meta-cognitive perspective.

4 - Quality Education

Name of the faculty: Edoadro Datteri

Contact for registration: dottorati@unimib.it